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Lobbying and Growth: Explaining Differences among OECD Countries ♦
Mehmet Babacan ∗

Abstract
The paper is an attempt to observe the effects of the development of rent-seeking or lobbying groups on the
growth pace of a number of countries. The relationship between the policy suggestions of competing
interest groups, and economic policies implemented both at micro and macro level after the 1980s revealed
the importance of lobbying effect on policies fostering or inhibiting most of the developing countries’ longrun growth levels. In addition to the vast literature on the positive theory of regulation and the theories of
competition among the pressure groups, the current study is to provide some examples of the literature on
lobbying and its effects on growth. Taking from Mancur Olson’s inspiring book, The Rise and Decline of
Nations, this paper reviews the following literature and discussions with special emphasis on Gary Becker
and Kevin M. Murphy’s works while adding an empirical component whether it is a panel or cross-country
data analysis. Availability of the relevant data is a major concern due to the inconsistencies in measuring
the size and effect of lobbying for each country. A set of countries including only the OECD members will
constitute the subject of the empirical investigation. The dataset on the special interest groups is provided
from K.G. Saur’s World Guide to Trade Associations as do the previous studies. For the purpose of the
further research, some derivations and proposals would be provided to solve the puzzle. The study has the
intuition that the development of lobbying powers is closely related to other political factors effective on
growth rates such as democracy, civil society. Overall, the paper is to investigate the role of lobbying on
growth rates on a multi-country level while implying the effects to change relatively in accordance with
country specific effects. Thus the conclusion will state that depending on the country specific patterns, each
OECD member exhibits slightly different effects of the relative size –by proxies- and number of business
interest groups on growth due to the country specific effects. This work specifically focuses on Turkey
which is shown to have negligible effect on the overall club members in terms of special interest groups on
growth.
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Regulation
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I.

Introduction
Theory of special interest groups and clubs is in essence the subject of multiple sub-disciplines
under the economic theory. Under the industrial organization literature for instance, there is a wide
consensus on the positive externalities of lower costs of forming special interest groups that serve
their members’ interests at best. The political economy of clubs has also been a subject of dispute
on the grounds of their welfare effects and class mobilization. The vast literature on explaining
growth dynamics on the other hand still promises different aspects of explaining differences among
countries, whether based on political or economic structures. The main question and discussions in
the growth literature has long been on the dynamics and the mechanism through which different
economic and social structures affect it. Emergence of political, economic or other social action
groups deserves a multi-dimensional approach for analysis since it has micro and macro
foundations at the same time. This preliminary study aims to bring up new arguments on the
differences among countries’ experiences in terms of the special interest groups. The current study
however due to its limitations will take two basic aspects of the ‘special interest groups’ or the
‘collective action groups’ as the pioneering economist Mancur Olson (1965, 1982) states: the
formation and the logic of operation of such groups and their indispensible relationship with the
countries’ long-term economic performance. As Olson (1982) states, the theories of social classes
and rigidities effective on relative growth are debatable and the empirical facts vary over time and
country whether they are in line with the theories or not. Possibility of multi-causal cases is yet
another concern regarding the relationship between growth and interest groups. Last not the least,
problem of testing is important as multi-casual diversity may imply the same empirical result while
having different reasoning and interpretations.
Theory of ‘collective actions’ as Olson (1965) puts it or the ‘clubs’ as Buchanan (1965) refers, have
two basic dimensions to be reviewed and analyzed in this work: the formation and determinants of
special interest groups or lobbying powers and their relationship with the growth performance
under a multi-country and time variant scheme. Taking from the long-debated arguments that Olson
(1965 and 1982) put forward, along with that of Buchanan’s (1965) regarding the theory of interest
groups, the paper will provide a short intuition on the factors leading to formation of successful
interest groups and the distinction on pure private and public goods. After the brief theoretic
introduction of different arguments and counter-perspectives, second section will reflect insights on
the empirical evidences in the literature, factual or counter-factual to Olson’s (1982) arguments on
the relationship between relative growth performances of different countries in different time spans.
The literature however provides contrary examples of empirical evidence depending on the sample
set and the existence of time sensitive data analysis. Therefore, it is evident that Olson’s (1982)
arguments on the negative effects of special pressure groups on growth rates could be refuted in
specific cases.
This study aims at indicating different empirical results stem from different social and political
structures along with the strength of pressure groups in a country within a relevant time span in the
third section. The most evident empirical differences are observed among the OECD countries

which include a diversified set of countries such as the Nordic, former Soviet and developing
nations like Mexico and Turkey. The empirical section for now only includes a set of data on social
and economic indicators along with the number of special interest groups which enable the data
analysis and some correlation matrices. Nevertheless, it is an intuitive section that could yield
further insight for data analysis in order to track the path for understanding the dynamics of interest
groups. Third section will also address the question of possibility of multi-casual relationship along
with the issues related to panel data analysis such as endogeneity. Last and the concluding section
will imply at least at the descriptive level that the effects of special pressure or interest groups
would differ on growth rates depending on the country and time specific effects along with the
relevant dummy variables such as the economic freedom and political stability and quality
indicators.

II.

Literature Review: Formation of Interest Groups and Effects on Growth
In an effort to understand the formation process and the structure of interest groups, Olson’s
pioneering work; The Logic of Collective Action (1965) should be counted with Buchanan’s leading
paper on the Economic theory of Clubs (1965) in order to provide some insight at structural level. In
his dissertation thesis, Olson (1965) makes use of the basic postulates for individual action that
presumes self-interest maximizing behavior while answering the question of interest group
structures in a society. Accordingly, a successful and prolonged interest group should be smaller in
size yielding positive gaining for its members that is the group actions to create an average level of
benefits exceeding the costs. The problem of ‘free-riding’ however may emerge under the condition
that there is no selective incentive. The larger the group size, the more the number of ‘free-riders’,
implies the theory. This is mostly due to the misalignment of interests among the group members
and the very trivial share of average benefit to the members in a very large group. Therefore, Olson
(1982) argues that smaller the group size, effective and successful is the lobbying activity. The
same is argued within the theory of clubs, by Buchanan (1965), who puts forward the conclusion
that given the set of adjustable property rights, the optimal group size tends to be smaller when the
average real income increases. Such a mechanism however would only work if the goods provided
by the group (i.e. privileges) are considered as exclusive in order to avoid the ‘free-rider’ problem
seen very common in public good provision. Selective incentives, as Olson (1982) puts it are not
always positive but sometimes occur at negative margins such as being excluded from the ‘club’.
Therefore, overall are five basic conditions for the formation and success of an interest group,
according to Olson’s (1982) theory:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)

Positive gains from lobbying
Existence of selective incentives
Exclusive goods (i.e. perfect market information on the specific good) that create negative
and/or positive externalities
Homogeneity of the group members/ alignment of interests
Existence of property rights regime or low cost of bargaining for collective action

Olson’s (1965, 1982); Buchanan’s (1965); Peltzman (1976) and Becker’s (1983) arguments all
point the theoretical fact that the smaller the size of and the bigger is the net benefit to the pressure
group, the more incentive that the individual has in joining and contributing the group. The
following set of equations –adapted from Olson (1982) - is to explain the mechanism:
where (C) is the cost of collective action as a function of the level (T) at which the good is
provided
where represents the value of the good to the group; while
number of the members of the group
while
where

is the ‘size’ therefore

is the fraction

is the net benefit to the individual that depends on the level of individual

expenditure

Under the maximization assumptions, first-order conditions should yield the following:
since
while
equation yields the following:

and

are constants. Replacing

into the preceding

. Therefore, the smaller the individual share, is, the less the individual is eager to
take part in the group as the average benefit gets smaller while the group size increases.
Following the above logical line, Olson (1982) argues that there will be no countries that attain
symmetrical organization of all groups with a common interest and thereby attain optimal outcomes
through comprehensive bargaining. Relatively more stable countries will tend to create more
organizations for collective action over time while members of ‘small’ groups have incredibly
higher organizational power, lowering the costs while that power is to diminish over time. And last
not the least, he argues that emergence and persistence of such interest groups overall reduces
efficiency and aggregate income in the society since they are divisive in nature. Two basic points
that both Tullock (1983) and North (1983) pay attention are: testing and refutability of Olson’s
theoretical and semi-empirical conclusions in a wider range of countries; and the position of the
‘statecraft’ as the main interest group.
Empirical evidence from the literature however exhibits significant variation as Coates et al. (2007)
derive the conclusion that the multi-year and cross-country empirical tests of Olson’s (1982)
arguments support that the interest group activity exerts a sclerotic effect on growth, capital
accumulation, and technological advance. The results however should only be interpreted as partial
success as Heckelman (2000) refers to Murrell’s (1984) counter-factual results. The most striking
feature of Coates et al. (2007a and 2007b) and Heckelman (2000) is the use of number of special
interest groups to proxy with how effective is the organization of such pressure groups in a society.
Their distinctive analysis however covers the non-OECD countries contrary to other works which

take the data-rich OECD countries as empirical samples. Coates et al. (2007a) focus on the
determinants of interest group formation as they analyze a set of 140 countries with some 618
observations in order to provide a more robust analysis and reconcile conflicting previous works’
results. Six hypotheses are tested with a broader sample: stability, development, political system,
nation size, government size, diversity while different panel data and cross-country setup tests are
utilized (1973 and 1999): natural log of number of groups function as the dependent variable along
with the other independent determinants. Their findings support Olson’s hypothesis that stability
fosters group formation; political system, nation size and societal diversity positively related to the
number of groups. Coates et al. (2007b) however directly focus on testing the relative effects of
interest-group activity on the GDP growth (in annual real terms); capital stock growth and
productivity growth, two channels of impact on the growth performance. A total of 86 countries
with 169 number of observations under a panel and two cross-country settings constitute the data
set for empirical part in their analysis. In order to avoid possible endogeneity problem, Coates et al.
make use of initial values of potentially endogenous explanatory variables as instruments, along
with latitude, a dummy variable for OECD membership, and a dummy variable for majority
Muslim population. They find that interest groups variable has clearly a negative sign while simple
correlation between interest groups and growth is positive although it takes a negative sign when
initial GDP, schooling, volatility and population are included. The instrumental variable (IV)
regressions clearly exert a more significant and negative impact of the interest groups on growth,
compared to that of simple OLS regressions. In their sensitivity analysis, Coates et al. consider the
possible differences among the developed and developing nations and conclude that there is not a
significant difference regarding the effects of interest groups on GDP and productivity growth.
Heckelman (2000) builds up his empirical work on the shoulders of the literature came after
Olson’s book while using a direct test methodology with relevant instruments, unlike the preceding
works, by Murrell (1984) who finds that the length of stability has a strong impact on the formation
of interest groups, for instance. As Heckelman (2000) puts forward, most of the studies have not
shown a strong correlation between interest groups and growth while in his empirical analysis, the
use of instruments increase the estimated impact of special interest groups on the economy.
Heckelman (2000) includes 22 OECD member and 20 other countries as the sample data set for his
analysis while instruments the strength of special interest groups by their numbers for each country.
Using the growth data for the 42 relevant countries between 1970 and 1980 from the World Bank’s
(1994) list, Heckelman analyzes the effects of the special interest groups on the economic growth
along with the uncorrelated error term, in is model. His instrument for the strength of the special
interest groups is their number as in Murrell (1984). After running several bivariate regressions
using IV (instrumental variable) method, Heckelman (2000) concludes that Olson’s hypothesis is
coherent given the soundness of the IV. In several other regressions run, where the initial level of
GDP; ratio of the gross domestic investment to GDP; the ratio of government spending to GDP;
total population and the ratio of the urban population to the total are included, Heckelman (2000)
indicates that the high correlation between the strength of special interest groups and growth rates
remain persistent. Even though, it is not so clear from inconsistent estimates of the lobbying power
effect on growth rates, the relationship could be said to carry a non-zero coefficient at least.
Providing a business perspective on the issue, another work focusing on East Asian countries,
Doner and Schneider (2000) find that the business associations contribute to the economic growth

in several ways such as macroeconomic stabilization and reform; horizontal coordination (like
quota allocation and capacity reduction); vertical coordination (upstream-downstream); lowering
information costs; setting standards and quality upgrading. According to their study, business
groups contribute to the economy mainly or under certain conditions solely by pursuing their own
interests. Two broad categories of contribution are described as ‘market-supporting’ and ‘market
complementing’ activities in the sense of interest groups’ contribution. Doner and Schneider (2000)
conclude that the well-functioning and contributing interest groups are the ones with higher
member densities; that provide valuable resources to their members and have adequate internal
mechanisms for mediating member interests.
Mork’s (1993) argument on the impact of lobbyists however may be even positive compared to the
non-lobbyist case. His basic intuition is that the growth rate would be higher in the case of lobbying
compared to the situation where lobbying activities are strictly banned such as in the former-Soviet
countries. In line with Olson’s (1982) arguments, Mork (1993) notes that lobbying activities have
bigger marginal effects at lower levels (i.e. # of the groups) and are subject to diminishing returns
in time. Murphy et al. (1991) however provide a different perspective on how easy a rent-seeking
society could develop interest groups and conclude that rent-seeking activity is subject to very
natural increasing returns thus having more returns at higher levels and second is it could afflict
innovative activity in the society and therefore hinder economic growth. Maitland (1985) on the
other hand concludes that Olson’s (1982) theory tested by the effects of business and labor groups
is empirically true under relevant circumstances such as the higher correlation between the overall
direction of the group and the members’ incentives. A series of empirical papers is subject to a
comparative analysis in the below table (following pages):

Table 1- Relationship between Special Interest Groups and Growth
Theoretical and
Descriptive: Maitland
(1985)

 “Encompassing”
Political Action
Committee (PAC)
analysis; based on
campaign
contributions

Theoretical and
Modeling: Mork
(1993)

 An endogenous
growth model with
lobbying like
Romer’s (1986);
based on knowledge
accumulation and
imperfect
acquisition

 Three level of PACs:
Business-Industry
 Firms rent capital;
(BIPAC), National
allowed to lobby for
Federation of
a subsidy on the
Independent Business
capital use; no
(NFIB PAC), the
collusion among
National Chamber
firms
Alliance and on the
labor side: AFL-CIO

 Measures of PAC

 Cost of lobbying
specified as a
percentage of the
firms’ output for a
given level of
lobbying effort

strategy: share of
contributions to
challengers; and the
share went to
Republicans or
Democrats in the case
of labor PACs (high
 The subsidy for
score: ideological- low capital use through
score: pragmatic) and
lobbying efforts is
partisanship measure
financed by lumpsum tax

 The size of the PACs

Theoretical and
Descriptive: Doner
and Schneider (2000)

 Business
associations
contribute to the
economic growth in
several ways such as
macroeconomic
stabilization and
reform; horizontal
coordination (like
quota allocation and
capacity reduction);
vertical coordination
(upstreamdownstream);
lowering
information costs;
setting standards
and quality
upgrading

 Business groups
contribute to the
economy mainly or
under certain
conditions solely by
pursuing their own
interests

 Two broad
categories of
contribution:

Empirical:
Heckelman (2000)



Empirical: Coates et
al. (2007a)

Empirical: Coates et
al. (2007b)

Includes 22 
Determinants 
Relationship
OECD member and
of interest group
between special20 other countries as formation under the interest groups and
the sample data set;
light of investigation economic growth
instruments the
questioned

Builds on
strength of special
Murrell (1984) and 
Includes a
interest groups by
Bischoff (2003)
total of 169
their numbers for
observations of 86
each country

Primary
countries as the
objective: to provide

Use of growth
sample data set
more reliable and
data for the 42

Referring to
thorough tests of
relevant countries
Olson’s (1982)
interest group
between 1970 and
previous test that
formation theories;
1980 from the World
found negative
second objective:
Bank (1994)
relationship between
reconcile the

Analyzes the
conflicting findings of income growth and
effects of the special
Murrell and Bischoff union membership,
interest groups on the
paper claims that the
Murrell

economic growth
group activity is not
(1984) finds support
along with the
well-reflected and
for Olson’s
uncorrelated error
there is a lack of
hypothesis that more
term, in his model
control for other
groups form in stable
growth determinants
environments by

Instrument
Coates and
for the strength of the freedom to organize 
Heckelman (2003a
special interest groups

Bischoff
is their number
and 2003b) find
(2003) finds no
negative relation

Runs several support at all
between interest
bivariate regressions
group activity and

Coates et al.
using IV
include a panel of 140 growth and
(instrumental
investment in a crosscountries, 618
variable) method
country setting
observations as the
sample data set for

Concludes

and their measure of  “Technology of
partisanship is
production”
effective on the
modeled in a
amount of
response function
contribution under
form (subsidy in
certain circumstances
terms of lobbying
(i.e. structure of
effort)
interest organization)

 Equilibrium level of
lobbying constant
over time; growth
rate constant over
time

 Three results
derived: i)
equilibrium growth
rate is higher in the
case of lobbying
compared to nonlobbying and policy
ban case; ii) if the
subjective discount
rate is low enough,
welfare improves;
iii) equilibrium
approaches the firstbest solution if the
response function
for lobbying is
initially very steep
while flatten outs so
quickly

that Olson’s
his analysis

Attempt to
hypothesis is coherent
directly test the

Six hypotheses
given the soundness of
relationship between
tested with a broader
the IV
interest group activity
sample: stability,
and growth with
development, political
 Several other
other determinants of
system, nation size,
regressions run,
growth in a panel
government size,
where the initial

Wellsetting w/ two time
diversity
level of GDP; ratio
functioning and
periods (1985 and
contributing interest of the gross domestic
1995)

Panel data
investment to GDP;
groups are the ones
and cross-country
the ratio of
with higher member

Accuracy of
setup tests (1973 and
densities; that provide government
data problematic for
1999): natural log of
valuable resources to spending to GDP;
developing nations;
number of groups as
their members and
total population and
groups assumed to
the dependent
have adequate
the ratio of the
possess equal power;
variable
internal mechanisms urban population to
no data on group
for mediating
the total are
strength

Findings
member interests
included
support Olson’s

Coates and
hypothesis that
Heckelman (2003)
stability fosters group
focus on groups per
formation; political
 Indicates that the
capita; find that a
system, nation size
high correlation
given # of group in a
between the strength and societal diversity
smaller country will
positively related to
of special interest
have more sclerotic
the number of groups
groups and growth
effect
rates remain

Support for
persistent

A log-linear
the group formation
regression; OECD
hypothesis tested by
membership proxy
Murrell (1984) and
for development
Bischoff (2003) with
exception of larger 
GDP growth
government
(annual average real
encourages interest
growth: 1985-1994
group formation
and 1995-2004) with
control variables
initial GDP,
schooling, volatility
and population
‘market-supporting’
and ‘market
complementing’
activities in the sense
of interest groups’
contribution



Find negative
relation between
growth and interest
groups

III.

Lobbying Power and Growth: A Counter-factual Relationship? Example from
OECD Countries
Empirical evidence is essential for crossing lines between growth performance of a specific country
as well as set of countries under the light of existing theoretical debates. Such a test should provide
a solid ground for contesting theories from different perspectives supported with different results. In
this study, a panel data set of the OECD countries has been worked on while inconsistencies among
the time intervals and lack of relevant information for the former-Soviet countries put the data
analysis under the limits of explanatory data analysis. In this preliminary format, we will provide a
general sense of the relative growth performances of the OECD countries depending on the country
and time-specific conditions. Many of the empirical studies such as Heckelman (2000); Coates et al.
(2007a and 2007b) focus on increasing the diversity among the sample countries thus see the
applicability of Olson’s (1982) theory on different set of countries such as the OECD and nonOECD. The major problem they face is also a limitation here: the inconsistency in the World Guide
to Trade Associations data for the number of interest groups. Therefore our analysis will only
provide two similar samples which belong to the 3rd, 5th and the 6th versions that include both the
business associations and chambers of commerce.
The dataset used here also comes from the Guide (eds. 1985, 1995 and 1999) while other
limitations come from the democracy variable which is proxied by Freedom House index of FIW
2001-2002; economic freedom index by The Heritage Foundation for only 1995, 1999 and 2002.
Growth rates are from the OECD’s website along with the data from World Development Indicators
(WDI) 2008 of the World Bank Group and Penn World Table 6.2 edition. The simple data summary
provided below suggest that there is a clear relationship between the included ‘exogenous’ variables
while there is still a high possibility of ‘endogeneity’ due to the theoretically strong relationship
between economic and political freedom and the development of special interest groups. The
dataset is composed of 30 OECD nations with 90 observations in three different points in time
(1985, 1999 and 2002). The number of interest groups is measured with the total of special interest
organizations and chamber of commerce in a specific country, while entering into the regression
with its per capita value.

Table 2- Number of Special Interest Groups (1985, 1999 and 2002) in the OECD members
Year
1999

1985

2002

OECD Member Country

# of
SIO

# of COC

# of SIO

# of COC

# of SIO

# of COC

Australia (1971)

196

182

339

136

302

143

Austria (1961)

1717

1695

1596

1575

1646

1636

Belgium (1961)

816

790

588

525

722

692

Canada (1961)

1228

1215

772

123

758

149

Czech Republic (1995)

43

41

103

10

117

47

Denmark (1961)

691

686

329

321

267

262

Finland (1969)

369

349

208

182

162

138

France (1961)

2860

2798

2215

1788

2137

1766

Germany (1961)

5058

5000

5965

5773

5279

5113

Greece (1961)

120

103

159

79

124

71

Hungary (1996)

38

37

55

30

40

20

Iceland (1961)

63

62

40

39

20

19

Ireland (1961)

215

199

210

144

259

197

Italy (1962)

905

804

394

259

449

213

Japan (1964)

867

847

868

800

713

667

Korea (1996)

64

58

117

64

166

125

Luxembourg (1961)

112

110

78

71

76

75

Mexico (1994)

255

214

263

209

190

146

Netherlands (1961)

1125

1098

647

587

562

527

New Zealand (1973)

54

52

102

79

100

79

Norway (1961)

660

655

400

381

375

362

Poland (1996)

108

108

73

5

71

27

Portugal (1961)

75

67

80

58

97

93

Slovak Republic (2000)

0

0

21

14

28

24

Spain (1961)

603

521

466

347

472

380

Sweden (1961)

528

512

362

343

362

337

Switzerland (1961)

1160

1126

1110

1059

1040

1021

Turkey (1961)

92

78

315

65

295

56

United Kingdom (1961)

2539

2497

2022

1841

2067

1910

United States (1961)

3383

3316

11519

3796

10526

4012

Source: World Guide to Trade Associations (ed. 3, 5 and 6)

Table 3- Cross-Country OECD Growth Rates (1985, 1999 and 2002)

OECD Member Country

1985

1999

2002

Real GDP growth

Real GDP growth

Real GDP growth

Australia (1971)

4,4

4

3,2

Austria (1961)

2,6

3,3

0,9

Belgium (1961)

1,7

3,4

1,5

Canada (1961)

4,8

5,5

2,9

Czech Republic (1995)

-11,7 1

1,3

1,9

Denmark (1961)

4

2,6

0,5

Finland (1969)

3,3

3,9

1,6

France (1961)

1,7

3,3

1

Germany (1961)

2,3

2

02

Greece (1961)

2,5

3,4

3,9

Hungary (1996)

0

3

4,2

4,4

Iceland (1961)

3,3

4,1

-0,1

Ireland (1961)

3,1

10,4

6,6

Italy (1962)

2,8

1,9

0,3

Japan (1964)

5,1

-0,1

0,3

Korea (1996)

6,8

9,5

7

Luxembourg (1961)

2,8

8,4

4,1

Mexico (1994)

2,8

3,8

0,8

Netherlands (1961)

2,3

4,7

0,1

New Zealand (1973)

0,8

5,3

4,6

Norway (1961)

5,4

2

1,5

Poland (1996)

4 (app.) 4

4,5

1,4

Portugal (1961)

2,8

3,8

0,8

Slovak Republic (2000)

3

0,3

4,1

Spain (1961)

2,3

4,7

2,7

Sweden (1961)

2,2

4,6

2,4

Switzerland (1961)

3,5

1,3

0,4

Turkey (1961)

4,2

-4,7

7,9

United Kingdom (1961)

3,5

3

2,1

United States (1961)

4,1

4,5

1,6

Source: OECD (2008); WDI (2008) and Penn World Table 6.2

1

Real GDP growth own calculation: Based on Penn World Table 6.2- year first available 1991.
World Development Indicators (WDI) 2008- GDP growth.
3
WDI 2008- GDP growth.
4
Own calculation for 1986 Based on WDI 2008- GDP growth.
2

The average growth rates of five-year and 10-year periods almost yield the same results since the
real GDP growth rates are used in logarithmic terms in order to avoid any negative or zero
relationship for the growth rate data. The simple correlation statistics in a cross-country analysis for
the three points in time exhibit a close relationship between the number and persistence of special
interest groups developed in a country while economic and political freedom has also distinctive
effects in the cases of former-Soviet countries along with Turkey. Countries such as Greece, Spain
and Portugal which witnessed military coups have become a relatively more stable and democratic
by 1985 already so that they exhibit more or less the same result: generation and prolonged
existence of special interest groups could hinder economic growth rates –of course explanatory only
in part. One important factor that limits the analysis is on the special interest group power which
seems to be best measured through their size which the dataset available lacks in the cross-country
sense. Adding that variable is expected to increase the explanatory power of the foremost
exogenous variables dramatically.

Table 4- Summary Statistics
Mean

Standard Deviation

Min.

Max.

Obs.

Independent Variable
Full Sample (OECD)
Number of Interest Groups
Ex-Soviet Countries

1700.133

2978.608

0

15315

90

88.33333

57.05712

0

216

12

300.3333

113.7995

170

380

3

2.885556

2.721143

-11.7

10.4

90

1.45

4.452476

-11.7

4.5

12

2.466667

6.476367

-4.7

7.9

3

5

Number of Interest Groups
Turkey
Number of Interest Groups

Dependent Variable
Full Sample (OECD)
Real GDP Growth
Ex-Soviet Countries
Real GDP Growth
Turkey
Real GDP Growth

Notes: In average/annual terms; real GDP growth rates replaced with GDP growth rates; where not available.
5

Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic.

The simple OLS estimation and a 2SLS procedure imply that the per capita number of special
interest organizations has little impact on the cross-country real GDP growth for the OECD sample
size for the years 1985, 1999 and 2002. It is crystal clear that the number of observations –which is
limited to 28 in our analysis- along with the yearly data, will have important effects in a more
advanced research. Due to the limitations however, we will content with the comparative results of
the two procedures cited above. The OLS estimation with the political freedom index causes the
number of observations decline to 28 while any regression leaving the political freedom index out
yields some 56 observations due to the missing data on economic freedom index and partly the real
GDP numbers for the given years. Below is a simple OLS regression with the political freedom
index variable, for the whole OECD countries, including Turkey.
Table 5- Real GDP Growth and Interest Groups
Dependent Variable

Real GDP Growth

Full Sample (OECD)

(OLS)

Independent Variable

Per capita SIO number (log)

-0.066
(0.871)

Economic Freedom

0.123
(0.081)

Political Freedom

1.989
(0.010)

Late Join dummy index

0.420
(0.735)

R-squared

0.30

Observations

28

Notes: Inside the parentheses are the p-values. The coefficients are for the whole OECD countries sample data set.

Omitting the political freedom index variable to increase the number of observations for a more powerful
analysis yields the per capita number of special interest organizations posing a positive relation with the
real GDP growth unlike in the previous regression. It is quite normal to have increased explanatory power
for the rest of the independent variables once there is an omitted variable while the quality of results tends
to decrease.

Table 6- Real GDP Growth and Interest Groups
Dependent Variable

Real GDP Growth

Full Sample (OECD)

(OLS)

Independent Variable

Per capita SIO number (log)

0.186
(0.580)

Economic Freedom

0.027
(0.611)

Late Join dummy index

0.523
(0.649)

R-squared

0.017

Observations

56

Notes: Inside the parentheses are the p-values. The coefficients are for the whole OECD countries sample data set. The political
freedom index variable is omitted.

Below table represents the regression results when Turkey, the only Muslim country and one of the OECD
members with the worst economic freedom index as of 2002, is excluded from the sample data set. The
coefficient of the per capita number of special interest groups do not vary much once an OECD member
country is removed while the effect of economic freedom gains more importance in explaining the real
GDP rates. Overall, the results do not change much with the removal of Turkey while the coefficient does
change its sign once the political freedom index is removed. The relationship between the per capita
number of special interest organizations and the real GDP growth rates in the years 1985, 1999 and 2002
for OECD countries –either Turkey excluded or not- however still remains as a puzzle.

Table 7- Real GDP Growth and Interest Groups
Dependent Variable

Real GDP Growth

Turkey excluded (OECD)

(OLS)

Independent Variable

Per capita SIO number (log)

0.146
(0.644)

Economic Freedom

0.039
(0.427)

Late Join dummy index

0.504
(0.648)

R-squared

0.022

Observations

54

Note: Inside the parentheses are the p-values. The coefficients are for the whole OECD countries, excluding Turkey for the
given years.

IV.

Conclusion
The present paper aims to see if the number of special interest groups has a strong effect on
countries’ growth rates and sees severe dilemmas and limitations when it comes to empirical
analysis. Two more steps are taken to improve the analysis: to use the log of average/single annual
real GDP growth rates and make use of the number of special interest group divided by the
population of countries. Using averages and percentages certainly improved the quality of the
empirical part even though a lot is still missing. The theory however could be refuted under
different country and time-specific characteristics that the past works have suggested so far. Next
steps for more robust results should include a strikingly powerful data set and approach of empirical
analysis to provide more robust intuition on Olson’s (1982) theory in practice. So far however,
Turkey is shown to have a negligible impact regarding the change on the effects of special interest
groups on growth performances.

Annex: Definition of Variables
Number of the SIOs: # of special interest groups as of five different cross-sectional datasets from
1973 (first), 1985 (third), 1995 (fourth), 1999 (fifth) and 2002 (sixth) editions of the World Guide to
Trade Associations (Zils and Verrel), by K. G. Saur:

Year

Edition of
WTG

Includes
chambers

1973
1985
1995
1999
2002

1st
3rd
4th
5th
6th

yes
both
no
both
both

Average real GDP growth rates: OECD data since 1960; Penn World Table 6.2 and World
Development Indicators (WDI) 2008 by the World Bank
Data on former-Soviet countries: WDI 2008 and the Penn World Table 6.2
Data on political rights and civil liberties: FIW 2001-2002 of the Freedom House (1: Free;
7: Not Free)
Economic freedom index (1 to 100): The Heritage Foundation & The Wall Street Journal
(1995, 1999 and 2002)
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Appendix

A. List of the OECD Countries with Entrance Dates
Australia / Australie (1971)
Austria / Autriche (1961)
Belgium / Belgique (1961)
Canada / Canada (1961)
Czech Republic / République tchèque (1995)
Denmark / Danemark (1961)
Finland / Finlande (1969)
France / France (1961)
Germany / Allemagne (1961)
Greece / Grèce (1961)
Hungary / Hongrie (1996)
Iceland / Islande (1961)
Ireland / Irlande (1961)
Italy / Italie (1962)
Japan / Japon (1964)
Korea / Corée (1996)
Luxembourg / Luxembourg (1961)
Mexico / Mexique (1994)
Netherlands / Pays-Bas (1961)
New Zealand / Nouvelle-Zélande (1973)
Norway / Norvège (1961)
Poland / Pologne (1996)
Portugal / Portugal (1961)
Slovak Republic / République slovaque (2000)
Spain / Espagne (1961)
Sweden / Suède (1961)
Switzerland / Suisse (1961)
Turkey / Turquie (1961)
United Kingdom / Royaume-Uni (1961)
United States / États-Unis (1961)
Source: OECD website, 2009.

B. Freedom House Map (2005)

Source: Freedom House, 2008.

